For almost a decade, executives, scholars, and trade diplomats have argued that filtering, censorship, localization requirements and domestic regulations are distorting the cross-border information flows that underpin the internet. Herein I make 5 points about digital protectionism.
"Hence, almost by accident, the WTO has put itself in an oversight position for most of the national laws and practices that regulate the Internet" (Wu 2006, 263-264) . Wu concluded that members of the WTO would have to decide how much control of the internet is legitimate domestic regulation, and how much is a barrier to trade (Wu 2006, 287) .
In truth, the WTO and other trade agreements say nothing about the internet or censoring (Burri 2013) , and very little about human rights on or offline (Aaronson with Townes 2012) .
Nonetheless, Wu's idea gained traction. In 2007, Google asked the USTR to fight censorship as a barrier to trade (Rugaber 2007) . Andrew McLaughlin of Google noted, "We take seriously Google's mission 'to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful,' but government efforts to censor the internet makes that task much harder" (McLaughlin 2007) . Herein I examine the state and implications of digital protectionism. I use process tracing to examine how policies towards digital protectionism, particularly in the US and the EU, evolved over time. Scholars use process-tracing in social science to study causal mechanisms and to link causes with outcomes (Beach and Pederson 2013) . I make five points;
1. Digital protectionism differs from protectionism of goods and other services because trade in information is different from trade in goods and other services. Information is intangible, highly tradeable, and some information is a public good which governments must provide and regulate effectively.
2. It will not be easy to set international rules to limit digital protectionism without a shared set of norms and definitions. However, we can only obtain greater clarity with trade disputes and clearer trade rules.
3. The US, EU, and Canada have labeled other countries policies' protectionist, yet their arguments and actions sometimes appear hypocritical.
4. China allegedly has used a wide range of cyber-strategies including DDoS attacks (bombarding a web site with service requests) to censor information flows and impede online http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/social-media/7802992/Foursquare-blocked-in-China.html; Jordan Calinoff, "Beijing's Foreign Internet Purge," FOREIGN POLICY, January 15, 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/15/beijings-foreign-internet-purge/.
market access beyond its borders. WTO members have yet to discuss this issue or the threat it poses to trade norms and rules.
5. Digital protectionism may be self-defeating. Governments that adopt digital protectionist strategies could experience unanticipated side effects, including reduced internet stability, generativity, and decreased access to information (Force Hill 2014; Zittrain et al. 2017 ).
Digital protectionism may also undermine human rights and scientific progress. (Swedish Board of Trade 2016, 52; OECD 2016; Aaronson 2016a ).
This article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I define protectionism and digital protectionism, and I illuminate the relationship between digital protectionism, domestic regulations, and trade/market distortions. I also examine what trade agreements say about digital protectionism and explain why it will be so difficult to develop shared rules. I then discuss what the US and the EU say about digital protectionism and show that their practices appear confusing and/or contradictory at times. I then focus on Chinese digital protectionism and how it may distort trade not only in the home market but other countries as well, a challenge for trade policymakers. Finally, I develop some conclusions and offer recommendations.
Before readers turn to the analysis, I offer some definitions of key terms. In this paper, I
utilize the term cross-border information flows rather than data flows. Many analysts use data and information interchangeably-they equate cross-border data flows with information flows.
Herein I use information (instead of data). Data is unprocessed facts or details. When data are processed, organized, structured, or presented in a meaningful or useful manner, it becomes information. Conversely, information can be defined as processed, interpreted, organized, structured or presented data-i.e. something useful. 3 Information is therefore the building block of the Internet as well as digital trade (goods and services delivered vis the internet and associated technologies). Information flows often move across borders because individuals, companies, or governments authorize information to be transferred from one country (the source of information) to another country where the information may be processed (like payroll) or utilized (to better counteract criminal patterns) (USITC 2013 (USITC , 2014 ; US Department of Commerce 2014).
II. What is Digital Protectionism?
To best understand digital protectionism, we first need to understand the meaning of protectionism. Protectionism is both an ideology and a government act (Irwin 1996) . Despite thousands of years of trade, and two centuries spent writing hundreds of trade agreements designed to limit protectionism, it has no exact definition (Swedish Board of Trade 2016, 5; McGee 1996) .
In 1982, the Office of the Special Trade Representative (now called the US Trade
Representative) drafted a primer on trade. It defined protectionism as "the setting of trade barriers high enough to discourage foreign imports or to raise their prices sufficiently to enable relatively inefficient domestic producers to compete successfully with foreigners" (USTR 1982, 149) . In this view, policymakers use protectionist measures to reduce the supply and/or raise the cost of imported goods or services, at the behest of some of their citizens. In this view, protectionism is about altering market conditions and distorting trade in ways that favor domestic producers over their foreign competitors.
However, this definition is clearly out of date. Protectionism evolves as both economies and governance change over time. Moreover, protectionism ebbs and flows in all countries depending on a wide range of factors including: the state of the economy, the political clout of interest groups dependent on trade or protection, public awareness of trade, or the strength or weakness of protectionist ideas (Aaronson 2001, 11) . For centuries, policymakers have used trade agreements to establish the rule of law in trade by obligating that signatories forbid certain types of protectionist practices. But policymakers have also long recognized that the policies that may appear protectionist may not have been designed to achieve trade distorting effects. For this reason, trade agreements also include "exceptions," which allow governments to breach the rules to achieve other important policy goals. As example, many governments adopt food safety regulations to protect consumers from harm, although these measures can distort trade. While these regulations may have a protectionist effect, they may lack protectionist intent (Swedish Board of Trade 2016, 5).
At first glance, digital protectionism may look like other forms of protectionism.
Policymakers in country A might use border measures or domestic policies such as subsidies to favor domestic providers or alter market conditions in country A. And as with trade in goods, officials might restrict trade in information to achieve other important policy objectives like protecting public morals or the privacy of their citizens. In so doing, they may, with or without intent, distort trade.
While the strategies to achieve digital protectionism may resemble protectionism of goods or services, digital protectionism differs from traditional protectionism in four key ways, delineated below.
• First: information is not just one thing-it can be a good, a service, or both simultaneously. Consequently, it may be hard for researchers to ascertain exactly what a government wants to protect and whether a government is acting with protectionist intent.
• Second: information is different from goods or services in that it also a form of currency;
it facilitates productivity, exchange, technology, and trade (Aaronson 2016a, 1-2) . While goods are material, information is intangible. Goods can be stored, some of the characteristics of goods are observable before purchase, consumption of goods always follows production, and goods move in space over means of transportation (Ariu 2012) .
Trade in information differs from trade in other services in that it is highly tradeable, whereas many services require the suppliers and the consumers to be in the same physical location in order for the transaction to occur (Lennon 2009 ).
• Third: trade in information is fluid and frequent, and location is hard to determine on the borderless network. Trade in the same set of information can occur repeatedly in nanoseconds (as example when millions of people download Beyonce's latest song).
Researchers and policymakers may find it hard to determine what is an import or an export. They also struggle to ascertain when information is subject to domestic law (such as IP law) and what type of trans-border enforcement is appropriate (Goldman 2011; de la Chapelle and Fehlinger 2016) . Policymakers can't easily determine jurisdiction, because information can be routed through a US server to another jurisdiction. There is no global consensus as to where and who should draw digital borders, because information flows may travel through several countries before these flows reach their final destination and customer (de la Chapelle and Fehlinger 2016).
• Fourth: economists generally agree that many types of information are public goods which governments should provide and regulate effectively. When states restrict the free flow of such information, they reduce access to information which can diminish economic growth, productivity, and innovation, both domestically and globally (Maskus and Reichman 2004, 284-85; Khan 2009; OECD 2016) . They can also effect the functioning of the Internet (Force-Hill 2014, 32; Daigle 2015 , Zittrain et al. 2017 ).
Hence, if officials restrict cross-border information flows, they may create many unintended consequences.
However, although some nations have agreed to language in trade agreements that limit This is not surprising, as the US is home to 11 of the world's 15 largest internet businesses.
China is home to the other four. 5 The US Department of Commerce reported that digital delivered services accounted for about half of all services trade (Fefer et al. 2017, 8) .
In Table 1 provides an overview of policies that the US labels as protectionist and provides examples of countries that have adopted such policies. Raise costs and impedes market access Sometimes Sources : Fefer et al : 2017; USITC 2013 USITC , 2014 OECD 2015 OECD , 2016 The US Government actively monitors digital protectionism. In 2014, the US Congress asked the ITC to dig deeper into the practices of major US trade partners. The ITC found that 49 nations have adopted 'digital protectionist' policies, and justified these policies as necessary to protect privacy and cyber stability. In its 2017 report (based on 2016 trade data) the US Trade
Representative found digital protectionism in many of its trade partners, including Indonesia, Russia, China, the EU, and Turkey (USTR 2016b (USTR , 2017 ).
The US is not alone in finding digital protectionism. Canadian firms also allege that other countries are increasingly using digital protectionism, and they are calling for rules to regulate it (McKenna 2013). A 2011 study by the Conference Board of Canada found that Canada faced a multitude of barriers to digital trade (Goldfarb 2011) . The European Union is also concernedas the world's largest exporter of digital services (WTO 2016, 124, Table A47 ; Hamilton and Quinlain 2016) . In a November 2016 speech, DG Trade Commissioner Malmström noted, "Restrictions on cross-border data flows inhibit trade of all kinds: digital and non-digital, products and services. We cannot just pretend that this doesn't exist, or that data has nothing to do with global trade" (Malmström 2016 ). On June 20, 2017, a prominent member of the EU Parliament, Marietje Shaake, warned that:
"governments around the world are drawing up barriers that hinder market access or create unfair advantages for domestic companies… These barriers also have negative impacts for people, whether it be higher costs, decreased access to products and content, violations of their human rights or uncertainty and distrust regarding the use or safety of certain products. If we believe the rule of law must prevail, then fair competition must be the goal in a hyper-connected world. There can be no place for digital protectionism" (Schaake 2017 ). 
III. It Will Not Be Easy to Set International Rules to Limit Digital Protectionism Without A Shared Set of Norms and Definitions.
The WTO would be the best place to set rules to govern digital trade because it covers 164 nations, and is therefore more consistent with the global internet. But it is not the most up- The GATS e-commerce chapter sets rules governing how nations can trade services that are electronically delivered. The GATS has two sets of exceptions: the General Exceptions 10 and the National Security Exception. 11 Under these exceptions, signatory nations can restrict trade in the interest of protecting public health, public morals, privacy, national security, or intellectual property, as long as such restrictions are necessary and proportionate, and do not discriminate among WTO member states. The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society. Moreover, WTO dispute settlement bodies have found that "measures must be applied in a manner that does not to constitute 'arbitrary' or 'unjustifiable' discrimination, or a 'disguised restriction on trade in services.'" Finally, when they use this exception, members should ensure that they use these exceptions in a reasonable manner so as not to frustrate the rights accorded other members by the substantive rules of the GATS (Goldsmith and Wu 2006) . There is no exception in the WTO to promote local culture. In Table III , I address whether practices that the US has label "protectionist" could be banned under existing WTO rules or could be viewed as practices allowed under the exceptions, so long as they are necessary and done in the least trade-distorting manner possible.
(b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests: (i) relating to the supply of services as carried out directly or indirectly for the purpose of provisioning a military establishment; (ii) relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or (c) to prevent any Member from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm To protect privacy, security Sources: Fefer et al. 2017; USITC 2013 USITC , 2014 Meanwhile, although the GATS states nothing explicitly about information flows, WTO members have begun to apply these obligations when settling disputes about cross-border information flows (Wunsch-Vincent 2006; Goldsmith and Wu 2006) . The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body has adjudicated two trade disputes related to information flows. After Antigua challenged the United States' ban on Internet gambling, the WTO ruled that governments could restrict service exports to protect public morals if these barriers were necessary, proportionate, and non-discriminatory (not discriminating between foreign and domestic providers).
12 The WTO's Appellate Body also examined China's restrictions on publications and audiovisual products, noting that commitments for distribution of audiovisual products must extend to the distribution of such products by the Internet. 13 However, neither dispute has provided clarity regarding key issues such as whether governments can, for example, restrict sales of offensive items such as Nazi memorabilia or censor and filter websites (Mattoo and Schuknecht 2000, 19-20; Goldsmith and Wu 2006 involving the publication, distribution, or sale of publications or printed music; the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film, video recordings, audio, or music video recordings; and radio communications, intended to reach the general public. US companies want the US to limit this carve out when they renegotiate NAFTA (Fortnam 2017a) .
The Obama Administration (2008-2016) negotiated TPP, and wanted to set the rules and processes governing digital trade to 'promote the digital economy through a free and open
Internet' (White House 2015) . As the talks progressed, US trade diplomats became increasingly concerned about digital protectionism, recognizing that it could threaten the dominance of US internet giants, which require relatively unrestricted access to operate and build new businesses like artificial intelligence and apps. Hence, TPP parties banned certain types of practices that 14 As of July 2017, it is unclear whether the EU-Japan deal will have binding e-commerce provisions.
could fragment the internet, reduce access to information, and/or increase the cost and difficulty of doing business online (Drake, Cerf and Kleinwächter 2016, 36; Aaronson 2016a) . The Obama Administration officials were also concerned about China's efforts to enforce its concept of cyber-sovereignty. Cyber-sovereignty, also known as information-sovereignty, can be defined as banning unwanted influences in a country's information space and shifting the governance of the internet from a multi-stakeholder forum to an international government body, such as the UN (Schia and Gjesvik 2017; Burgman 2016) . While other nations had introduced this concept in earlier debates about cross-border information flows, US officials worried about China's policies, given the Asian nation's influence as the second largest economy and the country with the most internet users. From their perspective, the TPP allowed the US and its allies, rather than China, to set the rules regarding information flows (Froman 2017) . However, in January 2017, in his first week in office US President Donald Trump announced that the US would formally withdraw from the agreement (Baker 2017) . Hence, the US, the leading demander of rules to govern digital trade and to define and limit digital protectionism, gave up the only binding language regulating digital protectionism.
TPP may not be dead. At a March 2017 meeting of TPP parties, Australia and Canada stated that they plan to move forward with the TPP. Japan has already ratified the TPP, and it has passed the New Zealand legislature (Elms 2017; Caporal 2017) . But as of August 2017, the Trump Administration remains wedded to "America-first strategies, and appears unwilling to reconsider TPP.
Despite Trump Administration criticism of TPP, the US Government is using TPP as a foundation to negotiate NAFTA. The US aims to secure commitments not to impose customs duties on digital products and to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of digital products transmitted electronically. The US also aims to "establish rules to ensure that NAFTA countries do not impose measures that restrict cross-border data flows and do not require the use or installation of local computing facilities" and to "establish rules to prevent governments from mandating the disclosure of computer source code." However, the USTR did not include language that encourages countries to adopt data privacy frameworks, nor does it include a demand that market access be allowed on the basis of turning over encryption codes, elements that were included in the e-commerce and technical barriers to trade chapters of TPP (Fortnam 2017a; Hoagland with Caporal 2017) .
The EU has also not yet moved forward with binding provisions regarding digital protectionism. The EU and Japan (and the EU and Mexico) drafted an e-commerce chapter which initially contained binding language regulating some aspects of digital protectionism, but instead of the chapter, the agreement includes a review clause that will allow the two sides to revisit the issue once the EU has a stated position. In July 2017, Inside US Trade reported that the European Commission trade and justice departments have been at odds over how to address cross-border data flows in trade agreements while ensuring that personal data is protected.
Industry groups in the EU shot down a Commission concept paper that they thought allowed too many exceptions and trade distorting data protection (privacy) regimes. The concept paper was structured along the lines of TPP. The first paragraph laid out the principle of free cross-border data flows, followed by a paragraph laying out exceptions to the free flow of data. Similarly, the third paragraph established the principle of a ban on data localization, followed by a paragraph with exceptions to that ban. However, some observers argued that the exceptions were crafted so broadly that any measure instituted by an EU trading partner could fit into the exception, making potential trade barriers impossible to challenge (Fortnam 2017b (Fortnam , 2017c .
Many of America's key trade partners don't agree with all aspects of the US definition or that specific policies are protectionist in effect or intent. For example, in 2015, members of the EU Parliament objected to the US Government labelling its policies, such as data protection laws, "protectionist" (Schaake 2015) . And as noted above, the Canadian government insists on cultural exceptions (which allows Canada to provide subsidies, quotas and restrictive investment policies) to maintain Canadian culture in the face of US and European competition.
In light of the failure to make progress at the WTO or through a binding FTA such as TPP, policymakers have turned to other venues in an effort to build greater understanding of the need to define and govern digital protectionism. In recent years, the OECD has issued a report defining barriers to digital trade and their spillovers as well as a major study on Economic and US truly distort trade (Chander and Le 2014, 2015; Berry and Reisman 2012) . However, until scholars and governments find common ground on defining and measuring digital trade, we are simply estimating the effects of alleged protectionist measures.
IV. Inconsistencies and Confusion Regarding Digital Protectionism
The US and the EU are the most vociferous in alleging digital protection. Yet so far, the US and EU have only been able to get their counterparts to limit two protectionist measures.
First they agreed to ban tariffs on goods and services traded online in the WTO. Secondly, for those signatories of the TPP, participating nations agreed to ban two types of alleged protectionist behavior-data localization and barring forced technology transfers. Under such forced transfers, companies in one country might be required to hand over source code or proprietary algorithms to do business in another country (USTR 2016a).
While both the US and the EU trade bureaucracies condemn digital protectionism, both trade giants have policies and practices that these bureaucracies would target and label as trade distorting were these policies and practices adopted by others. In fact, the government of Japan, which in July 2017 announced completion of a free trade agreement with the EU, suggested that the EU must develop and clarify its position on the relationship between data protection and digital protectionism. censorship. 20 In another example, the US Government routinely condemns censorship as a barrier to trade, although it has never challenged such behavior in a trade dispute. However, in 2016, the US cited China's Great Firewall as a barrier to trade, which could mean that the US is gathering evidence to challenge such broad censorship (USTR 2016b).
The EU also criticizes censorship (including the Great Firewall) as a barrier to trade. Yet the EU provides its citizens with a right to request delinking of sites-the 'right to be forgotten.'
If an individual asks to be forgotten and if an internet provider approves the request, the information will remain online at the original site, but will no longer appear under certain search engine queries. The EU provides this provision to its citizens in an effort to help its citizens protect their privacy. Some internet service providers may interpret such requests as onerous and trade-distorting, while some human rights activists believe that delinking undermines the public's access to information (Manjoo 2015; Toobin 2014 ).
Governments increasingly require internet firms to take down site content internet-wide that may be breach local intellectual property rules. Some observers consider such takedown governments that choose to censor must broadly block content if they want to censor effectively.
Moreover, the researchers found that once a government has surmounted the administrative, technical, legal and political obstacles to filtering, the government tends "to extend blocking to include political and social content as well as to the core tools and platforms." The researchers concluded that 26 of the 45 countries they sampled engaged in extensive filtering or censorship.
Moreover, a growing number of countries disrupt the internet as a whole when they filter (Clark et al. 2017 EU member states also have some inconsistencies. As noted above, Commissioner
Malmström has talked about digital protectionism but made it clear that data protection is not protectionist. "Let's not kid ourselves: some data restrictions out there are purely protectionist.
Rules that require data to be localized in a particular place, or that impose limits on transferring data, often have no justification, other than to inhibit market access by overseas companies. That is not data protection, it is protectionism; that is our trade partners not playing fair. And that is a legitimate topic for trade deals" (Malmström 2016 ). However, some see the EU's stringent approach to data protection as a form of censorship (Solon 2014 , Hern 2014 ). As noted above, European citizens have the right to demand delisting of information that breaches privacy. As it began to implement the right to be forgotten, Google said that it will censor content worldwide that it removes under the European Union's right to be forgotten mandate. But "worldwide" censorship will only apply to those searching from the EU country where the request was originally made. Google will close a loophole that currently allows people in a European country to view search results that had otherwise been deleted under the "right to be forgotten" (Google prefers the term "right to be delinked"). Google will use geo-location to ensure residents located in a given EU country can't see the search results on any version of the site, even as those outside the country can see them. Interestingly although Mexico also requires companies to protect the right to be forgotten, Google is not yet compliant (Fleisher 2017 , Pickrell 2017 ).
The EU has announced that it aims to create a Digital Single Market (DSM) among the 27 (without the UK) EU member states. Citizens will have better online access to digital goods and services with shared rules, and the digital economy will be better positioned to drive growth.
Although the EU has one approach to data protection (the General Data Protection Regulation), many EU member have data localization requirements that make it hard to transfer data among the EU 27. These states argue that these rules are necessary to protect the privacy of their citizens. 24 Moreover, one observer contends that there are some 40 provisions in this regulation that will still allow individual member states to set their own data protection standards (Qassim 2016 ).
Hence, data protection regulations are a patchwork even among the 28 (soon to be 27) nations within the EU that aim to foster a common market. This fact should lead trade policymakers that are unfamiliar with this situation to educate themselves and announce that we need to find common ground on data protection rules and cross-border information flows to avoid a mismatch among national rules. Airlines. All the thefts are attributed to Chinese actors which appear to be aligned with the government but his allegation is difficult to prove) (USCC 2016, 192, 198, 199-204) . In 2015,
China agreed with the US that neither country's government will conduct cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, although again, cyber theft was not clearly defined (USCC 2016, 209) .
Meanwhile, the US government has stressed that it does not use surveillance for commercial 24 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/facilitating-cross-border-data-flow-digital-singlemarket; and https://mc.gov.pl/files/free_flow_of_data_-_non-paper_od_lm_eu_member_states_dec._2.pdf theft. Nonetheless, in the summer of 2015, WikiLeaks provided evidence that the US Government had spied on Japanese companies and policy makers related to trade negotiations; President Obama called Japanese Prime Minister Abe to apologize. In 2015 as well, Chancellor Angela Merkel's office said it found that the US Government had used Germany's top spy agency to watch European corporate targets. The US Government still insists that it is not stealing corporate property and giving it to US companies. However, citizens and government officials in the US and abroad may find it hard to distinguish between cyber monitoring to prevent crime and terrorism and cyber probing to steal technologies (Aaronson 2016a).
d. Regulatory Context: The US argues that governments which fail to make an appropriate regulatory context for the free flow of information are effectively distorting trade. In 2015, it chided China, South Africa, Thailand, and the UAE for unclear internet rules. It criticized South
Africa for failing to effectively enforce its laws online, named Vietnam and Turkey for overreaching bans on internet content, and condemned France for its proposals to tax internet activity (USTR 2015). Meanwhile, the EU member states have several policies that could be considered distorting to trade. For example, not only do EU member states have different approaches to privacy, they also have different approaches to cultural "protection." Some EU members such as France have cultural exceptions (e.g. percentage of cultural goods and services that must be locally produced and broadcast). In another example, some EU member states also allow geo-blocking-the practice of denying access to users in one jurisdiction to services based on the user's geographic location.
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Cybersecurity regulations provide an example of the importance of finding common ground on the relationship between domestic regulation and cross-border information flows.
Given the rise in malware, hacking, and disinformation, 26 governments may at times seek to restrict cross-border flows to maintain political stability, trust and personal security. In June 2017, members of the WTO debated whether or not cybersecurity strategies could distort trade.
Some members were concerned that such regulations would negatively impact trade in information technology products, potentially discriminating against non-domestic companies and technologies, and possibly leading to unnecessary disclosure of commercially confidential and technical information. Others argued that cybersecurity rules are needed to address national security issues and to ensure consumer privacy, and that the measures in question were nondiscriminatory (WTO 2017) . In looking at the debate between China's cybersecurity regulations and US insistence that these regulations are protectionist, researcher Dan Ikenson concluded that the objectives of both governments have less to do with cybersecurity than they do with protectionism (Ikenson 2017) . However, others may not believe it is so easy to ascertain protectionist intent.
V. China's Censorship at Home and Abroad: New Tactics and Market Access Consequences
China is one of the world's largest and fastest growing internet markets. Only some 50% of its citizens are online as of 2016, so the internet in China has plenty of room for growth (UNESCO 2016). Thus, many online firms believe they must compete in China. However, the Chinese internet is likely the world's most restrictive and monitored. The Open Net Initiative, a collaborative project that monitors internet censorship using both qualitative and quantitative analysis, claims that China operates "the most extensive, technologically sophisticated and broad-reaching system of internet filtering in the world" (Deibert 2008, 3) . The government blocks sites by Internet protocol address and blocks and filers uniform research locators (URLs) and search engine results. The country supposedly employs 2 million individuals to censor the internet. Chinese officials argue that the nation must restrict the web to maintain social stability and security amid threats like terrorism (Reuters 2016). However, China has different censorship systems for foreign and domestic sites (Erixson, Hindley, and Makiyama 2009 Not surprisingly, the US Trade Representative describes China's internet regulatory regime as restrictive and opaque (USTR 2015, 70-72, 77-79) . Legal scholar Henry Gao describes it as arbitrary and often unreasonable (Gao 2011, 371) . Greatfire.org, a website monitoring
Chinese censorship found 878 of 1233 Wikipedia pages and 769 of 947 google pages were censored in China. 27 Under WTO rules, China is supposed to provide a system of judicial or administrative review of such blockage, but no such system is available (Schruers 2015; Kaplan 2008 ).
Moreover, China's approach to censorship is evolving. The government does not only rely on paid censors, but upon the acquiescence of companies providing internet services within the country. These companies must follow local law or withdraw from the market. Take internet data centers and cloud companies located in China were ordered to participate in a threehour drill to hone their "emergency response" skills. They were essentially to practice taking down websites that had been deemed harmful (Jiang: 2017) . With these steps, China has made it almost impossible to get around the Great Firewall.
However, China is not only censoring and effecting market access in its home market.
Since 2008, researchers have found evidence that the Chinese government has exported censorship beyond its borders. In testimony before the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, Ron Deibert, the Director of the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, asserted that China used distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in Tibet, the US, UK, Canada and elsewhere since 2008. He noted that these methods deny access to information by disabling the sources of information (rather than blocking requests for information as filtering systems do).
Researchers find it hard to pinpoint the source of such attacks so governments can deny ever using such methods (Deibert 2008, 4) . Moreover, with DDoS, China can censor abroad without asserting the heavy hand of government.
In 2015, researchers at the Citizen lab (Marczak et al. 2015) and several other organizations asserted that China essentially took down two US based websites, GitHub and GreatFire.org. 28 Github is an open source site which manages and stores revisions of projects using code and serves as a platform for online collaboration. Github hosts GreatFire.org (which monitors the Great Firewall) and the New York Times Chinese edition. In examining the attack, the Citizen Lab alleged that the government of China used a "Great Cannon" to harness internet traffic headed to China's most popular search engine Baidu and redirect it to flood these two overseas websites. The Great Cannon can not only shut down the connection, but apparently the hackers hijacked traffic to these addresses and replaced benign unencrypted web content with malicious content (CECC 2016, 200-201; Perlroth 2015) .
The researchers noted that the attacker targeted services designed to circumvent Chinese censorship. Meanwhile, Baidu denied that their servers were compromised, although the analysts were able to prove that the hackers had injected malicious javascript into Baidu connections (Marczak et al. 2015, 1, 8-9) . Hence, a Chinese company, Baidu, was hijacked and victimized as part of the attack.
China is not the only country to use a DDoS attack to disable website. Both the US and UK tampered with internet traffic to launch attacks (Marczak et al. 2015) . However, neither country did so to control information. The researchers concluded that deployment of the Great Cannon was a significant escalation in state-level information control because censorship was enforced by "weaponizing users," rather than by direct government action. Moreover, China's alleged tactics created a dangerous precedent-contrary to international norms, puzzling those attempting to ascertain why China chose to act in this way (Marczak et al. 2015) . (Perlroth 2016; Schneier 2016) . In 2017, researchers alleged (without proof) that someone used a distributed denial of services (DDoS) attack to take down the twitter site of Guo Wengu, the Chinese billionaire who now lives in the US, and who is slowly providing information on corruption among senior officials in China (Charlie 2017; Perlroth 2016) .
While several research groups pinned the GitHub attack on China, we do not know who is behind the rise in DDoS attacks in the US. Moreover, while the attacks may have come from
Chinese entities that may be affiliated with the Chinese government, it is impossible to provide that the Chinese government ordered these attacks. Attribution, although accepted in some courts, do not "prove" that China is beyond these actions or prove that the rise in DDoS attacks to China alone (Schneier 2016; USCC 2016) . That said, the South China Morning Post reported that the government had been planning the attack for over a year.
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According to Bill Marczak, the leader of the Citizen Lab team, China has not used this tactic since 2015. 30 Yet the allegations of DDoS by Chinese affiliated entities in the US and UK have important implications for trade and trust in the internet. These DDoS attacks change market access conditions in the attacked company's home country since a company attacked (such as Twitter) can't serve its customers if its site is down. Thus, attacks reduce market access, raise costs for firms who must hire researchers to ascertain who is responsible for these attacks while also spending money to get their sites back These DDoS attacks also reduce internet stability and diminish the predictability of information flows (Google 2010; Gao 2011; Kaplan 2008 ). To put it differently, these tactics essentially bring Chinese censorship to the US and other countries. These attacks should prod policymakers to raise the question of whether the trade regime can and should address such issues.
VI. The Costs of Digital Protectionism: Direct Costs and Unanticipated Spillovers.
Digital protectionism may be self-defeating. While there is no consensus regarding how to define, let alone remedy, digital protectionism, a growing number of researchers find costly spillover effects. The ECIPE estimated that data localization regulations cost EU citizens an estimated $193 billion per year, in part due to higher domestic prices (Bauer et al. 2014 ).
However, the costs of digital protectionism are not always economic; they can also affect the stability of the internet as a whole (Bildt 2012) . In 2011, the OECD reported that Egypt's shutdown of the internet for five days led to 'direct costs of at minimum USD 90 million' (OECD 2011). A 2016 Brookings study estimated that the economic impact of internet censorship filtering and blocks was $2.4 billion, which the author noted as an understatement of the actual economic damage of lost tax revenues, the negative impact of worker productivity, etc. (West 2016) . Sarah Box of the OECD says that such reductions in internet openness can affect global value chains and reduce technology diffusion, thereby undermining development and trade (Box 2016, 2) . Governments that adopt digital protectionist strategies could hurt their own consumers and place their firms at a competitive disadvantage since such measures may increase costs to business (Elms 2017) . In short, digital protectionist strategies can backfire.
Analysts recognize that there is no easy way to measure internet openness or closure, or the effects of digital protectionism upon the internet as a whole. Nevertheless, they agree that "the dynamism of the Internet depends in large part upon its openness" and that variants of protectionism, like censorship or data localization, can reduce that openness (Bildt 2012; Box 2016; OECD 2016 acknowledged that the Great Firewall may make it harder for China to becoming an innovationdriven economy (Gao 2017; Chu 2017; Haas 2017) .
Some scholars also assert that digital protectionism undermines internet stability and interoperability. Data localization policies, filtering, or censorship can alter the architecture of the internet, which has long favored technical efficiency over state politics. When officials place limitations on which firms can participate in the network, they may reduce the overall size of the network, and once again potentially raise costs (Force-Hill 2014, 32; Daigle 2015; Drake, Cerf, and Kleinwächter 2016) . Finally, digital protection can undermine access to information, reducing innovation and the ability of citizens to monitor and hold their governments to account (OECD 2016; Aaronson 2016a Aaronson , 2016b .
VII. Conclusion: The Need for Common Ground
The idea of using trade agreements to regulate digital protectionism may well be one whose time has arrived. Digital protectionism is an issue that is both increasingly visible and contested. Trade policymakers are struggling to define it, develop shared norms, and regulate it.
For example, some corporate officials consider European efforts to establish the digital single market as an EU wide approach to protectionism. Mark Scott of the New York Times noted, "The latest digital reforms-either on purpose or by coincidence, depending on people's viewpoints-take aim at that dominance, and potentially give European publishers and telecom companies a helping hand to compete head-on with their American rivals" (Scott 2016) . On the other hand, Nicky Stewart, a former internet strategist for the UK Cabinet said the EU was simply trying to develop rules that conformed to EU values (Stewart 2017) .
Digital protectionism has some commonalities with traditional protectionist objectives and strategies. Government officials have a wide range of legitimate reasons why they may seek to limit cross-border information flows. For example, many want to develop an indigenous tech sector, requiring them to develop an effective enabling environment that includes competition, digital literacy, and infrastructure policies. In this pursuit, officials might sometimes take steps that discriminate against foreign market actors and in so doing, distort trade, even though this may not be their original intent. Policymakers also want to encourage the rule of law online and prevent unlawful behavior like the dissemination of hate speech or child pornography, fraud, identity theft, cyberattacks, and money laundering. Here again, these policies may be necessary to achieve important domestic objectives, yet they may discriminate against foreign firms (Aaronson 2016b) . What may appear protectionist to one country may be seen as a legitimate and necessary regulation in another.
Advanced industrialized countries like the US and Germany are not finding it easy to put in place an effective enabling environment for digital trade at home without distorting crossborder flows. But finding this balance is even more difficult for developing countries. Many developing country policymakers lack the skill, expertise, and funds to establish an effective domestic enabling environment. 31 Digital technologies are constantly evolving and policymakers struggle to catch up.
Digital protectionism is also different from traditional protectionism because information is both a good and service, and often a public good. But some policymakers who seek to protect are also developing new tactics to protect beyond tariffs, quotas, and exchanged controls.
China's alleged efforts to use DDoS attacks to censor global websites also seems to make it harder and more expensive for firms to access their home (and other) markets. Although these attacks are increasingly visible and numerous, trade officials have yet to openly discuss what this means for the meaning of market access and rules based trade. exceptions. For these reasons, government officials should work at the WTO to discuss these issues. Specifically, policymakers should:
1. Ask the WTO Secretariat to examine whether domestic policies that restrict information (short of exceptions for national security, privacy, and public morals) constitute barriers to cross-border information flows that could be challenged in a trade dispute.
2. Some governments engage in hacking or encourage state sponsored hackers to use malware or DDoS attacks to improve the competitiveness of their firms or censor the internet in other countries. Policymakers should call on the WTO to convene a study group to examine the trade implications of these tactics as a means of distorting trade and how the WTO can deal with these implications. These tactics should be banned, although the WTO may not be the best forum to discuss these problems. 
